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Great Idea! Here is some factual information that has been de-classified. You should be able to get lots of ideas. Sorry for the length but the SOF did quite a bit in DS. EYES ONLY - U.S. Special Operations in Operation Desert Storm 1990 - 1991 Iraq invaded Kuwait a few hours before dawn on 2 August 1990, easily overrunning the Kuwaiti defense forces and massing along the Saudi Arabian border. While the Saudi forces established a thin defensive cordon along the border, the United States deployed air and ground forces to the Arabian Peninsula to deter further Iraqi aggression. The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) had military responsibility for this area and prepared to reinforce the Saudi Arabian forces. Its special operations component, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT), likewise prepared to deploy and conduct combat search and rescue operations and other assigned missions. SOCCENT personnel deployed to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 10 August 1990 and moved to King Fahd International Airport (KFIA) on 17 August. Its naval element, the Naval Special Warfare Task Group (NSWTG), arrived in Saudi Arabia on 10 August 1990 and received its second increment of personnel on 9 September 1990. Meanwhile, SOCCENT’s Air Force element, AFSOCCENT established its headquarters at KFIA on 17 August 1990. In late August, the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) [5th SFG(A)] deployed two battalions to King Khalid Military City (KKMC) and retained the third at KFIA. Army aviation assets of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment also deployed to KKMC. COALITION WARFARE Coalition warfare (warfighting with forces from more than one nation) was arguably the most important of all the SOCCENT missions. With Saudi concurrence, SOCCENT’s first coalition warfare mission was given to NSWTG elements, which deployed to the Kuwait/Saudi Arabian border on 19 August 1990 to provide close air support and to serve as “trip wires” in case of an Iraqi invasion. The 5th SFG(A) began replacing the SEALs on 5 September 1990, and provided early warning, coalition warfare training, and communications for close air support. The number and type of coalition warfare missions grew steadily throughout DESERT SHIELD and into the early part of DESERT STORM. The Saudis requested more Special Forces teams to train them on the M-60A3 tank, artillery, vehicle maintenance, and other technical areas. Other allied forces, as they deployed to the Arabian Peninsula, wanted Special Forces to provide close air support and liaison with friendly forces. These increasing requirements for coalition warfare soon absorbed much of the 5th SFG (A). COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE (CSAR) During DESERT SHIELD, SOCCENT established procedures for CSAR, a mission that planners expected would be of critical importance, given the projected losses of coalition aircraft. Before it would launch a CSAR mission, SOCCENT required a visual parachute sighting and a voice transmission from the downed pilot, as well as enemy threat analyses. SOCCENT conducted full scale CSAR exercises before the Air War started. support the CSAR mission, SOCCENT established forward operating bases near the Saudi border, close to the projected areas of operation. The first successful CSAR operation of DESERT STORM occurred on 21 January 1991. An Iraqi missile had shot down a Navy F-14, 60 miles northwest of Baghdad, and the pilot had evaded capture. At 0730, an MH-53J Pave Low helicopter launched from Ar Ar in a fog so thick that even when flying at 100 feet, the crew could not see the ground. They flew 130 miles into Iraq but could not contact the pilot-their coordinates for his location were nearly 50 miles off. The helicopter returned to Ar Ar to refuel and launched again at 1200. With better coordinates, the crew arrived at the pilot’s location just as an Iraqi truck was descending upon him. The helicopter copilot directed the two A-10 fighter planes flying overhead to “smoke the truck.” The A-10's destroyed the truck with cannon fire, and the helicopter picked up the pilot. The next successful CSAR effort occurred on 23 January when a USAF F-16 pilot bailed out over the gulf. A Navy SH-60B helicopter carrying two SEALs launched from the USS Nicholas and found the pilot six miles off the Kuwaiti coast. The SEALs jumped in the water, attaching a rescue harness to the pilot; the helicopter crew retrieved all three and returned to the Nicholas just 35 minutes after launching. The rescuers reported the mission went “flawlessly” and described the pilot as “cold, but in good condition.” On 17 February 1991, an F-16 went down in southern Iraq 36 miles from the Kuwaiti border. Slightly injured, the pilot parachuted into a heavy concentration of Iraqi troops but still established contact with rescue forces. Two MH-60s from the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment launched from Raffia, plucked the pilot from the desert, and returned him directly to KKMC for medical treatment. For a number of reasons, most downed aircrew members were not rescued. The aircrews needed better survival radios, and there were not always visual sightings of open parachutes. Many pilots landed in areas of heavy Iraqi concentrations, and the Iraqis often beat the SOF rescuers to the downed airmen SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE (SR) Special Operations Forces conducted SR missions along the Iraqi border during DESERT SHIELD, providing CENTCOM with timely intelligence and an early warning capability. During the war, SOCCENT’s SR efforts supported the ground offensive. SOCCENT forces conducted twelve SR missions during DESERT STORM. One mission included 15 separate near-shore boat operations that the NSWTG conducted in Kuwaiti waters between 30 January and 15 February as part of CENTCOM’s deception plan. Another mission encompassed six searches for mines by SEALs in the northern Persian Gulf. Three SR missions continued the early warning network which the SEALs and 5th SFG (A) troops had established with Saudi and Kuwaiti forces during DESERT SHIELD. The campaign plan for the ground war called for the XVIII Airborne Corps and VII Corps forces to drive deep into Iraq, flanking and then enveloping the strong Iraqi defenses in Kuwait and southern Iran. This movement would leave the flanks of both corps vulnerable to counterattack. The corps’ commanders requested SOCCENT provide SR teams to go deep inside Iraq, watch important lines of communication, and look for enemy movement toward the exposed flanks. G-Day was set for 24 February 1991. Three missions provided ground reconnaissance of the main routes that Iraqi units could use to move into VII Corps’ area of operations. Two of the missions successfully infiltrated on 23 February; they reported regularly on enemy activity until advance elements of the 1st Cavalry Division arrived on 27 February. The third team, inserted among Iraqi forces, had to be exfiltrated. Special Forces launched three other SR missions on 23 February, these in support of the XVIII Airborne Corps. One team landed in the middle of a Bedouin encampment and called for an emergency exfiltration. After being picked up, they scouted the area for an alternate site and saw enemy activity everywhere. Coming under AAA and SAM attack, they aborted the mission. Another team went into the Euphrates River Valley to report on Iraqi military traffic moving along a major highway. During the insertion, one of the aircraft flew so low to avoid Iraqi radar that it tore loose its rear wheel on a sand dune. By daylight the team was in place, having dug “hide” holes in a drainage canal about 300 meters northwest of Highway 7. To the horror of the hidden Americans, the surrounding fields came alive with people that morning, and some Iraqi children and an adult soon spotted them. A party of 25 armed villagers, joined by an Iraqi Army company, and moved toward the team. Calling for close air support and an emergency extraction, the Americans destroyed their classified gear, engaged in a short but hot firefight with the Iraqis, and retreated to better fighting positions. Using their emergency radio, the team contacted close air support aircraft, which dropped cluster munitions and 2,000 pound bombs within 200 meters of the embattled team until nightfall. During one lull in the air strikes, two members of the team charged down the canal and eliminated an Iraqi element. After dark, the team moved 300 meters from the canal, where a helicopter extracted them without further opposition. Another special reconnaissance mission sent two three-man teams to monitor an area between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Communications glitches prevented one team from reporting what they saw, and the team was picked up early on 27 February. The second team’s reconnaissance site put it in the midst of Bedouin encampments, so team members established a hide site along a drainage canal. At daylight, they discovered their “hide” site was near a major thoroughfare. Many Bedouins passed by without noticing them, but a sharp-eyed little girl compromised them. The team fled with armed Bedouins in hot pursuit. Iraqi soldiers soon joined the firefight. The team held off the Iraqis for an hour and a half until F-16s appeared, followed by a 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment Blackhawk. Although riddled by small arms fire, the helicopter made a dramatic daylight rescue of the team. From 29 January until 16 February, NSWTG elements conducted nearshore and offshore reconnaissance missions in support of CENTCOM’s deception strategy to fix Iraqi attention on a potential amphibious invasion by U.S. Marines. The SR missions resulted in the collection of information, established a naval presence along with the Kuwaiti coast, and focused the attention of the Iraqi command on a possible maritime invasion. The deception effort culminated in a large-scale operation on the night of 23-24 February 1991, the eve of the ground offensive, which simulated a beach reconnaissance and clearing operation. The deception campaign prevented Iraqi units at the beaches from reinforcing those being attacked in the west. DIRECT ACTION MISSIONS During DESERT STORM, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, CINCCENT relied heavily on allied air power to hit targets which otherwise would have been SOF direct action (DA) missions. Even so, SOCCENT executed some critically important DA missions, SOF’s first and most important DA mission involved the destruction of two Iraqi early warning radar sites guarding the southwestern approaches to Iraq at the start of the Air War. Neutralizing these sites allowed allied aircraft to fly undetected toward the SCUD complexes in western Iraq. Colonel Jesse Johnson, the SOCCENT Commander, turned to AFSOCCENT, his Air Force component, to plan the operation. The concept called for MH-53 Pave Low helicopters to guide AH-64 Apaches to the targeted radar sites, which the Apaches would destroy. On 14 October, Colonel Johnson assured General Schwarzkopf that he and AFSOCCENT were 100 percent certain of the success of this mission. The Apache and Pave Low crews quickly worked out interoperability issues, and they conducted a full dress rehearsal in late December with the crews duplicating the formations, routes, bearings, times, and attack tactics. At 1500 on 16 January 1991, SOCCENT informed the Apache / Pave Low task force that the mission was a "go” for that night. H-Hour for the start of the Air War was 03:00 on 17 January with the opening helicopter strike beginning at 0238 hours. The task force consisted of White and Red teams, with two Pave Lows and four Apaches assigned to each one. At 00:58 on 17 January, the White Team lifted off from Al Jouf and headed toward the border followed 15 minutes later by the Red Team. Flying less than 100 feet off the desert at 100 knots, the two teams avoided detection and safely reached the initial point, approximately 7.5 miles from the targets, where the Pave Lows dropped chemical lights and returned to the rendezvous point north of the border. The Apache pilots updated their navigational and targeting systems, flew toward their targets, and within seconds of the appointed time opened fire on the radar sites, All aircraft returned safely. Colonel Johnson then notified General Schwarzkopf of the mission’s success. At the same time, combat control teams installed radar beacons along the Saudi-Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders to direct allied attack aircraft to the gaps in the early warning radar system. SOF had played a crucial role on the opening night of the Air War. AFSOCCENT conducted two other DA missions: Dropping BLU-82 bombs and AC-130 fire missions. The BLU-82 "Daisy Cutters” were 15,000 pound bombs capable of destroying everything in a three mile radius on the flat desert terrain. Because of the anti-aircraft threat, AFSOCCENT planners determined that the bomb should be dropped from 16,000 to 21,000 feet. Accordingly, MC-130E Combat Talons flew five missions that dropped a total of 11 BLU-82s on minefields and Iraqi military positions. These huge bombs cleared wide routes through minefields, and their enormous blast either killed the enemy or acted as a potent psychological operations weapon. AC-130s flew fire missions in support of ground forces, to attack the SCUD missile sites, and to engage Iraqi troops. Although these aircraft belonged to AFSOCCENT they were under the operational control of Central Command’s air component, CENTAF. This arrangement resulted in the AC- 130s being used for inappropriate missions in medium threat areas. After an AC-130H was engaged by SAMs while on a SCUD hunting mission, the AFSOCCENT commander was given mission oversight responsibility to ensure these SOF assets were used correctly. On 31 January 1991, AFSOCCENT suffered the single worst air loss by any coalition unit when an AC-130H Spectre gunship (“Spirit 03”) was shot down while providing fire support to U.S. Marines defending Khafji against an Iraqi attack. Three gunships were airborne that morning over the Marines, and the first two had destroyed numerous Iraqi armored personnel carriers. At 0600, “Spirit 03” was due to end its patrol when it received a call from the Marines, who wanted a missile battery engaged. The crew of “Spirit 03” took out the battery, but as dark gave way to daylight, a surface-to-air missile hit the aircraft. At 0635, the aircraft sent out a “mayday” distress call and then crashed into the gulf. All 14 crewmembers died. During DESERT STORM, British Special Operations Forces carried out their own missions in western Iraq. One British mission - very close to Baghdad - included four American SOF personnel (three Special Forces and one Combat Controller) brought along to coordinate close air support. Their goal was to destroy a buried fiber optic cable supposedly used for SCUD command and control. Two helicopters inserted the twenty Brits and four Americans on the night of 23 January slightly southwest of Baghdad. Digging teams found and cut several cables, but found no fiber optic cable. They then crammed 800 pounds of explosives into the hole and blew up what was left of the cables. After 11/2 hours on the ground, the team returned safely to Al Jouf by helicopter. Naval Special Warfare units also had direct action missions. On 18 January 1991, when U.S. helicopters came under fire from seven oil platforms in the Durrah oil field, NSWTG elements counterattacked. SEALs boarded and cleared each of the seven platforms, capturing prisoners, weapons3 and documents. Eight special boat unit personnel and 32 Kuwaiti Marines also seized Qaruli Island on 8 February, Maradim Island the next day, and Kubbar Island on 14 February-these operations were the first reclamation of Kuwaiti territory. In the final hours of the war, NSWTG and Kuwaiti forces seized Bubiyan Island and captured its Iraqi defenders. SEALs also flew aboard Navy helicopters for both CSAR and countermine missions, during which they destroyed 26 moored and floating mines. THE LIBERATION OF KUWAIT CITY - OPERATION URBAN FREEDOM SOCCENT assisted Kuwaiti forces in liberating their capital city and reestablishing Kuwaiti governmental authority. SOCCENT initiated Operation URBAN FREEDOM when allied forces reached the outskirts of Kuwait City. SOCCENT deployed to Kuwait City International Airport on 27 February, along with 3d SFG (A) teams and other personnel. Surprisingly, the Iraqis had abandoned the city, and the liberation forces met little organized opposition. As a precautionary measure, SOF units conducted a “take down” of the US Embassy compound in Kuwait City. A ground convoy, composed of SEAL fast attack vehicles and 3rd SFG (A) soldiers, surrounded the compound while a Special Forces assault force fast roped onto the roofs of buildings and searched for Iraqis and booby traps. None were found. SCUD HUNTING Coalition forces had air superiority in the skies over Iraq and Kuwait from the war’s first air strikes on 17 January 1991. Unable to do battle in the air, Saddam Hussein struck back with a clumsy, unsophisticated weapon-the SCUD missile-which he ordered to be launched at Israel. Tactically, the SCUD would not have a major impact, but its strategic effect was felt on 18 January, when seven SCUDs hit Israeli cities. If continued attacks brought Israel into the war, then the Coalition aligned against Saddam might crumble. General Schwarzkopf’s insistence that the SCUD was not a significant military weapon did little to placate the Israelis or ease the pressure on the Bush Administration. By the end of the first week of the war, over 30 SCUDs had been launched at targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia. The air campaign was not working fast enough to eradicate the mobile SCUD launchers. By the end of January, the diplomatic pressure on the Bush Administration was such that General Powell ordered General Schwarzkopf to use Special Operations Forces to hunt SCUDs and stop them from being fired at Israel. A Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), made up of special operations air and ground units, arrived in Saudi Arabia by 1 February. Operating from a base at Ar Ar in western Saudi Arabia, the JSOTF had a daunting mission: stop the SCUD attacks on Israel. Reconnaissance and surveillance teams would have to go hundreds of miles inside western Iraq and attack the SCUD infrastructure. The first JSOTF cross-border mission, consisting of 16 SOF personnel and two vehicles, occurred on 7 February. It set the pattern for subsequent cross-border operations. Armed MH-60K Blackhawks, called Defensive Armed Penetrators (DAPs), accompanied the insertions. Once on the ground, the teams hid during the day and conducted reconnaissance at night. These SOF operations proved to be so successful-especially the Blackhawk attacks on SCUDs and SCUD-related targets-that General Schwarzkopf on 14 February approved augmenting the JSOTF with a reinforced Ranger company and more 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment helicopters. By the time the ground war started, the JSOTF was conducting a wide range of operations. As many as four SOF teams at a time were inside Iraq, conducting operations against the SCUD complexes. These teams called in F-15E, F-16, and A-10 sorties to strike the targets they found. On 26 February, SOF attacked a radio relay site: first, AH-6 attack helicopters peppered the radio relay compound with mini-gun and rocket fire; Rangers then secured the compound and set charges to destroy the 100-meter tall tower. The Blackhawks also conducted “Thunder Runs,” which were direct action missions on SCUD’s, their lines of communication, and other command and control facilities. The JSOTF also used “Gator” minefields to limit SCUD mobile launcher movement. Because of JSOTF operations, the number of SCUD launches fell dramatically, and their accuracy was greatly impaired. PSYOP AND CA MISSIONS Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Civil Affairs (CA) units contributed significantly to the success of the Gulf War. The PSYOP campaign was directed toward individual units and soldiers, and stressed a single theme: the coalition’s quarrel was with Saddam Hussein and not with the Iraqi people or its army. In the early phases, the PSYOP program emphasized “peace and brotherhood;” it later evolved to stronger themes, and finally turned to surrender appeals and threats. Once begun, the PSYOP campaign (in conjunction with sustained air attacks) steadily eroded Iraqi morale. Resistance crumbled quickly when the coalition ground forces attacked. A total of 86,743 Iraqis were taken prisoner and most of them possessed surrender leaflets when they capitulated. Some 29 million leaflets were dropped from a variety of aircraft, with a few more distributed by artillery shells and balloons. Three AM and two FM ground stations transmitted “Voice of the Gulf” broadcasts for 72 days, which interspersed 3,200 news items and 189 PSYOP messages” among sports and music programs. The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force (CCATF) was created in February 1991 to provide emergency services for Kuwait City once it was liberated. Relief operations began on 28 February 1991 when the first convoy rolled into the city. The CCATF stayed in Kuwait City for two months before turning the relief effort over to the Army Corps of Engineers. During that time it distributed 12.8 million liters of water, 12,500 tons of food, 1,250 tons of medicine, 750 vehicles, and 245 electrical generators. CONCLUSIONS Flexibility best describes Special Operations Forces’ contribution to the DESERT STORM victory. Initially tasked with providing CSAR, SOCCENT steadily expanded its missions as conventional commanders gained confidence in SOF’s unique abilities and resources. The coalition support mission became an important new SOF capability, used later in operations in Somalia and Bosnia; the new geopolitical environment had made SOF more relevant. The SCUD hunting mission demonstrated SOF’s ability to deploy rapidly and start operations with little delay, and to execute missions of the gravest national importance.